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ABSTRACT – Many scholars think that all conventions of the constitution emerge 
from the bottom up, out of the practices of constitutional actors. Here we develop the 
first systematic account of conventions that are imposed from the top down, through 
prescriptions by constitutional actors. We show that ‘top-down conventions’ (as we 
term them) can be created through the use of normative rule-making powers; that 
powers of the right kind are sometimes conferred by ‘bottom-up conventions’; that these 
powers are often exercised; and, as a result, that top-down conventions are increasingly 
common. We show, too, that as the formal, systematic, and intentional products of a 
small number of constitutional actors, top-down conventions are a potentially 
illegitimate form of constitutional regulation.   
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INTRODUCTION 
It used to be said that ours is a ‘historic’1 constitution: the 
constitution is the product of evolution, not deliberate design; it 
emerges from the bottom up, rather than being developed from 
the top down. This is no longer true, if it ever was. Over the past 
20 years, the pace of deliberate constitutional change has been 
relentless. The most obvious changes have been to the legal part of 
the constitution. Parliament has expanded human rights 
protections, regionalized power, and upended ancient institutions 
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1 The term is used by A.V. Dicey in his unpublished lectures on the 
Comparative Study of Constitutions. We owe the reference to V. Bogdanor, The 
Monarchy and the Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 64.  
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in a series of grand constitutional statutes. Judges, meanwhile, have 
been busy developing common law constitutional rights and 
positioning the rule of law as a counterweight to parliamentary 
sovereignty2. These legal changes have understandably held 
scholars’ attention.  
What has gone relatively unnoticed is a parallel trend in the 
non-legal, conventional part of the constitution. Constitutional 
conventions traditionally emerge from the bottom up, out of the 
practices of constitutional actors. The convention that requires the 
monarch to do as her ministers advise is a ‘bottom-up convention’, 
for example, as is the convention that entitles the monarch to 
advise, encourage, and warn her ministers. Many scholars maintain 
that all conventions of the constitution are bottom-up 
conventions. They deny that there are or could be conventions 
created from the top down, through the exercise of rule-making 
powers held by constitutional actors.  
In this article we develop the first systematic account of ‘top-
down conventions’. The first part of our account is descriptive and 
conceptual. We show that top-down conventions are made 
possible through a certain kind of normative rule-making power; 
that powers of the right kind are conferred by some bottom-up 
conventions; that these powers are often used; and as a result that 
top-down conventions are ubiquitous. Many rules of the 
Ministerial Code, for example, derive from a convention that gives 
the Prime Minister the authority to make rules which bind 
ministers. Many inter-governmental rules, including in the 
devolution context, owe their existence to a convention that 
empowers institutions to bind themselves. The second part of our 
account is normative. We begin to develop an account of the 
desirability of constitutional conventions which is differentiated 
between the different kinds of convention identified in our first 
part. On the one hand, we suggest that bottom down 
constitutional conventions are modestly virtuous. But on the other 
hand, we come to sceptical conclusions about the value of top-
down constitutional conventions. 
                                                 
2 See, eg, R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] AC 1787; Jackson v 
Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262.   
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CONVENTIONS 
The British constitution, like all constitutions, consists of rules. 
What makes a rule a part of the constitution? Two conditions are 
necessary, and for present purposes we can treat them as 
sufficient.3 First, the rule must have a constitutional character. That 
means the subjects of the rule – those to whom it applies – must 
be either constitutional actors qua constitutional actors (monarch, 
minister, judge, etc) or institutions of government (House of 
Commons, Supreme Court, local government, etc). Also, the rule 
must be of constitutional importance.4 The rules regulating the 
Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction are likely constitutional, for 
example, whereas the rules about the Court of Appeal’s vacations 
are almost certainly not. The line between rules that have a 
constitutional character and rules that do not is, of course, difficult 
to draw exactly; but, it is enough that the line exists and that there 
are clear instances on each side.  
 The second condition is about ownership, and it takes more 
explaining. Any rule exists by virtue of certain facts. These facts 
are the grounds of the rule. Some rules are grounded in the fact of a 
special kind of social practice; these are social rules. Some rules are 
grounded in the fact of a prescription made by someone with a 
special kind of power; these are prescribed rules. Finally, some rules 
are grounded in their legitimacy, ie, the fact they ought to be used 
as a guide to conduct; such rules are legitimate rules. In theory, a rule 
might be merely legitimate. Perhaps some moral rules are like this. 
Such a rule does not have a social existence: it is not grounded in 
people’s thoughts or actions. People might never have heard of the 
rule, let alone have ‘engaged’ with it.5 Plainly the rules of the 
                                                 
3 Here we are restricting ourselves to rules that regulate conduct, rather than 
rules that create governmental institutions.  
4 The analogy here is to the subject matter of constitutional statutes. See, eg, A. 
King, Does the United Kingdom Still Have a Constitution? (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2001) 1; P. Craig, ‘Constitutionalising Constitutional Law: HS2’ [2014] 
PL 373, 389–390; F. Ahmed and A. Perry, ‘Constitutional Statutes’ (2017) 37 
OJLS 461. For certain conventions to exist, they must be regularly observed, 
and thus possess a degree of practical importance. See text at n 10 below.   
5 A term we borrow from J. Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 5 ½ Myths’ (2001) 46 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 199, 200.   
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British constitution are not like this. The constitution is our 
constitution. Its rules are our rules, and they are our rules because 
they are grounded in what constitutional actors here think and do. 
The rules of the constitution may be legitimate, but they cannot be 
merely legitimate. The rules of the constitution must be either 
practised or prescribed by constitutional actors.  
 Of the rules which belong to the constitution, some are legal 
rules while others are non-legal rules. Since A.V. Dicey’s 
Introduction to the Law of the Constitution, the traditional name for a 
non-legal rule of the constitution has been a ‘convention of the 
constitution’6. The name is apt to mislead, however. In ordinary 
and (especially) philosophical contexts, ‘convention’ suggests 
something that is usually or normally done.7 With this sense of 
‘convention’ in mind, one might assume that all conventions of the 
constitution are grounded in a practice, and hence that all 
conventions are social rules. Were this assumption correct, a 
prescription could never ground a convention on its own. That is 
in fact what many scholars think. It is not, however, what all 
scholars think – and it is not what we think.  
We have no desire to break with established usage, but we need 
to be careful to avoid confusion. So we shall use the term convention 
to refer to any non-legal constitutional rule, regardless of 
grounding. And we shall stipulate that a bottom-up convention is any 
non-legal rule grounded in a social practice, and that a top-down 
convention is any non-legal constitutional rule grounded in a 
prescription.  
BOTTOM-UP CONVENTIONS 
We will argue in the next section that top-down conventions are 
made possible by bottom-up conventions of a certain type. To 
                                                 
6 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: 
Macmillan, 8th ed, 1915) 277. 
7 eg, D. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). Joseph 
Jaconelli and Mark Elliott both seem to think that conventions of the 
constitution must be conventions in Lewis’s sense: J. Jaconelli, ‘The Nature of 
Constitutional Convention’ (1999) 19 LS 24, 39-40; M. Elliott, ‘Parliamentary 
Sovereignty and the New Constitutional Order: Legislative Freedom, Political 
Reality and Convention’ (2002) 22 LS 340, 361. 
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show that there are bottom-up conventions of this type, we need a 
rough-and-ready account of the practice that grounds a bottom-up 
convention. This section provides that account.  
We shall start with Sir Ivor Jennings’ test for bottom-up 
conventions in The Law and the Constitution. According to Jennings, 
when we want to know whether there is a convention, 
 
[w]e have to ask ourselves three questions: first, what are the 
precedents; secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe 
that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason 
for the rule? A single precedent with a good reason may be 
enough to establish the rule. A whole string of precedents 
without such a reason will be of no avail, unless it is 
perfectly certain that the persons concerned regarded 
themselves as bound by it.8  
 
The first two questions ask whether a non-legal rule is grounded in 
a type of practice. That practice consists of a behavioural element 
(the ‘precedents’) and an attitudinal element (the actors’ belief they 
are bound by a rule). The third question asks whether there is a 
reason for the putative rule, and thus about the rule’s legitimacy. 
Jennings does not explicitly say that these questions are only about 
constitutional rules, but the point is implied from the context.  
 The quoted passage is not as clear as it might be, so let us set 
out how we understand it. Jennings is sometimes taken to claim 
that there is a convention if and only if all three of his questions 
are answered ‘yes’. This would have two consequences. The first is 
that practice would be insufficient to ground a convention. Practice 
would suffice only in combination with a reason. As the last 
sentence of the quoted passage suggests, however, and as other 
passages confirm, Jennings thought that practice alone could 
ground a convention.9 Whether a rule is supported by a reason is 
                                                 
8 Sir I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London: University of London 
Press, 4th ed, 1952) 136. Jennings’ test has been endorsed by courts in Canada 
(Reference re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753, 888), India 
(Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441, 
[444]), and recently in the UK (Evans v Information Commissioner [2012] UKUT 
313 at [75] (AAC).  
9 ibid 135. 
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relevant only to the strength of the practice (eg, the number of 
precedents) it takes to ground a convention. The second 
consequence is that practice would be necessary for there to be a 
convention. But this is not what Jennings believed either. It is clear 
from his remarks elsewhere that Jennings thought that there are 
some top-down conventions, and thus some conventions that are 
not grounded in practice.10  
 Jennings is therefore best read as claiming that a certain practice 
is sufficient but unnecessary to ground a convention. Schematically, the 
idea is that there is a convention that As ought to B if (1) As B 
often enough, and (2) enough constitutional actors believe there is 
a convention that As ought to B (where As are members of some 
class of constitutional agent, and B is an act of constitutional 
importance). What counts as ‘enough’ precedents or ‘enough’ 
actors is left vague, but it will depend at least partly on whether 
there is a reason for a convention that As ought to B. Because any 
rule that satisfies this test is grounded in a practice, it is a test for a 
bottom-up convention. Let us call it Jennings’ Test.  
There is much to like about Jennings’ Test. In particular, it 
correctly states that the practice that grounds a bottom-up 
convention has a behavioural element and an attitudinal element. 
But Jennings’ Test has a flaw, which is that it misdescribes the 
attitudinal element. The test says that a convention is the product 
of a belief that the rule that is the convention is binding. So it says 
that a convention is the product of a belief that the rule that is the 
convention already exists (ie, before the formation of the belief). 
This belief would necessarily have been mistaken when formed. 
Consider the convention that monarchs ought to do as their 
ministers advise, which Rodney Brazier terms the ‘Cardinal 
Convention’.11 Jennings’ Test would say that the Cardinal 
Convention arose from the mistaken belief that the convention 
already existed. Surely this is not right. Conventions are not always 
the result of misapprehensions of conventions; those whose beliefs 
                                                 
10 See, especially, Jennings’ discussion of conventions governing 
Commonwealth relations: n 8 above, 97, 98-99. 
11 R. Brazier, Constitutional Practice: The Foundations of British Government (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 1999) 178. 
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help bring conventions into existence are not always open to 
criticism for holding those beliefs. 
To correct this flaw in Jennings’ Test, we need a better account 
of the attitudinal element of the practice that grounds a 
convention. This is easier than it might seem. When Jennings 
formulated his test, there were no well-developed theories of social 
rules. We can do better now. Several decades after Jennings wrote 
The Law and the Constitution, H.L.A. Hart published The Concept of 
Law. There Hart set out a new theory of social rules, which has 
dominated thinking about social rules in jurisprudence ever since.12 
Like Jennings, Hart thought that a social rule (such as a bottom-up 
convention) is grounded in a practice consisting of a behavioural 
element and an attitudinal element. And, like Jennings, Hart 
thought of the behavioural element as a pattern of general 
conformity with the putative rule. But unlike Jennings, Hart did 
not think of the attitudinal element as a belief in a binding rule. 
Instead Hart said the attitude that helps ground a social rule is a 
‘critical reflective attitude’ which he called ‘acceptance’.13  
What is acceptance? Hart’s own remarks are somewhat sketchy, 
but recently one of us has built on Hart’s work to try to give a 
satisfactory answer.14 The attitude that helps ground a social rule is 
acceptance of the proposition that is the content of the rule. Thus, 
the social rule that As ought to B is partly grounded in the 
acceptance that As ought to B. To accept a proposition is to treat 
it as true (to proceed on the basis that it is true, to take it for 
granted). What it means to treat a proposition as true depends on 
the context. To treat it as true that As ought to B may, for 
example, include praising As for Bing; criticising As for not Bing; 
acknowledging the legitimacy of like praise and criticism by others; 
and using normative language (eg, ‘ought’, ‘wrong’) to express 
these reactions. Acceptance has other features, in addition to how 
it displays itself. The two features that will matter for our purposes 
are, first, that acceptance is under a person’s control – it is up you 
                                                 
12 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (L. Green (ed), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 56-58, 255-57. Jaconelli was the first to note the connection 
between Jennings’ Test and Hart’s account of social rules: n 7 above, 28-31. 
13 ibid 57.  
14 A. Perry, ‘The Internal Aspect of Social Rules’ (2015) 35 OJLS 283. 
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what to accept and what not to accept; and, second, that 
acceptance is responsive to practical reasons.  
Putting these points together, there is a bottom-up convention 
that As ought to B if and only if (1) As B often enough, and (2) 
enough constitutional actors accept that As ought to B. The 
Cardinal Convention, for example, is grounded in the fact that 
monarchs do as their ministers advise and that constitutional 
actors accept that monarchs ought to do as their ministers advise. 
There is no suggestion here of a mistaken belief (indeed, no 
suggestion of any belief), so the flaw in Jennings’ Test is avoided. 
Much more could be said about the practices that ground bottom-
up conventions. However, this is all we need to know about 
bottom-up conventions to explain top-down conventions, to 
which we now turn.  
TOP-DOWN CONVENTIONS 
Everyone can agree that top-down conventions are possible in 
principle. There is nothing impossible about grounding a non-legal 
rule of the constitution in a prescription. After all, non-legal rules 
are grounded in prescriptions in other contexts (games, 
corporations, religion, etc); why not in the constitutional context, 
too? Some scholars go further and claim that there are in fact top-
down conventions. That is what Jennings thought, as we said.15 
Kenneth Wheare granted that most conventions arise from the 
bottom up, but added that: 
 
a convention may arise much more quickly …. There may be 
an agreement among the people concerned to work in a 
particular way and to adopt a particular rule of conduct. This 
rule has not arisen from custom; it has no previous history 
as a usage.16  
 
                                                 
15 See text and references at n 10 above. 
16 K. Wheare, Modern Constitutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951) 180.  
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Geoffrey Marshall17, O. Hood Phillips18, Eric Barendt19, Brazier20, 
Andrew Heard21, and many other scholars acknowledge that there 
are top-down conventions. Parliamentarians also regularly assume 
that conventions can be grounded in prescriptions. The 2006 
report on The Governance of Britain, for example, took for granted 
that the House of Commons could choose to ‘develop’ a 
‘parliamentary convention’ requiring the Commons’ approval of 
certain uses of the war powers prerogative.22 Until recently, 
probably the dominant view was that top-down conventions exist 
alongside bottom-up conventions.  
 Sometime in the 1990s or early 2000s, the tide began to turn. 
There are more and more top-down sceptics, who say that there are no 
top-down conventions, and more strongly that no one has the 
power to create a top-down convention (as opposed to having 
such a power and not using it). The sceptics can now count among 
their number Nicholas Aroney23, Mark Elliott24, Joseph Jaconelli25, 
Aileen McHarg26, and Adam Tomkins27, among others. McHarg 
says that if we ‘recognis[e] the importance of practice’ we shall see 
that constitutional actors and institutions ‘cannot unilaterally create 
                                                 
17 G. Marshall, ‘What are Constitutional Conventions?’ (1985) 38 Parliamentary 
Affairs 33, 38.  
18 O. Hood Phillips and P. Jackson, O. Hood Phillips’ Constitutional and 
Administrative Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed, 1987) 120. 
19 E. Barendt, Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 43. 
20 S. de Smith and R. Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: 
Penguin, 1998) 42. 
21 A. Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions (Don Mills: Oxford University 
Press, 2nd ed, 2014) 7-11.  
22 Governance of Britain, Report Cm 7170 (2007) at [29].  
23 N. Aroney, ‘Law and Convention’ in B. Galligan and S. Brenton (eds), 
Constitutional Conventions in Westminster Systems: Controversies, Changes, and Challenges 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 32. 
24 Elliott n 7 above, 361. 
25 Jaconelli n 7 above, 39-42. 
26 A. McHarg, ‘Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law, Convention, 
and Soft Law’ (2008) 71 MLR 853, 857-861. 
27 C. Turpin and A. Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 7th ed, 2011) 191; A. Tomkins, ‘A West Lothian 
Answer?’ (Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum, 28 March 2013) at 
<https://goo.gl/27dsXD> (last accessed 21 December 2017). 
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binding constitutional rules’28. Jaconelli says that the ‘real essence’ 
of any convention is a ‘system of concordant actions and 
expectations’29, ie, a type of practice. Similar claims can be found in 
recent parliamentary reports. The McKay Commission, for 
example, hoped that there would arise a convention requiring the 
consent of English MPs to ‘English laws’, but cautioned that it ‘has 
to emerge from practice’, and cannot ‘be created at the will of a 
government’.30  
 This sceptical trend notwithstanding, there are top-down 
conventions, as we shall show. Even if you are not a top-down 
sceptic, what follows is of importance, because it contains a novel 
argument for the existence of top-down conventions.  
Rules and Powers  
To recall, a top-down convention is a kind of prescribed rule, and 
thus the product of a kind of power. Let us start there, with the 
kind of power at issue. One kind of power is influence: the ability to 
affect people’s reasons and their beliefs about their reasons.31 
Influence may be exercised by shaping circumstances so as to 
make it easier for people to achieve some goals rather than others, 
or to convince people to adopt certain goals in the first place. 
Influence may be exercised through declarations and orations, or 
through action other than speech, such as by setting an example. 
Influence has many uses, among them the creation of social rules. 
Suppose a group of wealthy people declare that they will give most 
of their money to charity after they die. They encourage others to 
do the same. Over time, there arises a social rule among the very 
rich that wealth ought to be donated on death. The original group 
of donors created a social rule – but indirectly, by causing the 
conditions under which there is a social rule.  
                                                 
28 n 26 above, 862. 
29 Jaconelli n 7 above, 42. 
30 The McKay Commission, ‘Report of the Commission on the Consequences 
of Devolution for the House of Commons’ (House of Commons Library, 
March 2013) at <https://goo.gl/DMfBWr> (last accessed 21 December 2017).   
31 J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, rev 
ed, 1990) 99.  
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 Conventions can also be the product of influence. Consider the 
Salisbury-Addison Convention. To prevent a constitutional crisis, 
Lord Salisbury and Lord Addison came to the understanding that 
the House of Lords would give a second reading to ‘manifesto 
bills’ that originated in the House of Commons. Lord Salisbury 
and Lord Addison abided by this understanding themselves, and 
encouraged others to do so also. Over time, there arose a 
convention, with content similar to Lord Salisbury and Lord 
Addison’s original accord. The two peers could be said to have 
created the convention – but again, they did so indirectly, by 
fostering the conditions under which there is a bottom-up 
convention. Were power as influence the only kind of power that 
could be used to create a convention, all conventions would be 
bottom-up conventions, and the top-down sceptics would be 
vindicated.  
There is, however, a second kind of power: normative power. For 
present purposes, we shall adopt Joseph Raz’s influential theory of 
normative power.32 According to Raz, you have a normative power 
when an act of yours is the exercise of a normative power. An act 
of yours is the exercise of a normative power when it meets two 
conditions. First, your act must create a rule directly and non-
causally. The creation of the rule is the ‘result’33 of the act, not its 
consequence, where the relationship between an act and its result 
is intrinsic, and the relationship between an act and its 
consequence is causal. Second, your act must be recognised as 
creating a rule because it is expected that, if it is so recognised, 
then you will tend to perform that act only when you intend to 
create a rule.  
The power to contract illustrates what Raz has in mind. By 
performing certain acts – making representations and so on – you 
and another party may create a contract, and thus a legal norm. 
You do so directly, without any intermediate step. Your acts are 
the ground of the contract, not its cause; a contract is not a mere 
effect of the acts that give rise to it. Moreover, the law recognises 
certain acts as creating a contract partly because it is desirable for 
people to have a way to bind themselves, and it is expected that, if 
                                                 
32 ibid 101-103. 
33 n 31 above, 103.  
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the relevant acts are recognised as creating a contract, people will 
tend to perform those acts only when they intend to bind 
themselves. So, the power to contract is a normative power, which 
is of course the intuitive result.  
The power to contract is a legal power, but normative powers 
also exist outside the law. Were there a normative power to create 
a convention, and were that power to be exercised, then there 
would be a top-down convention. So, the question at this point is 
whether there are normative powers to create conventions. The 
question can be narrowed by distinguishing two types of 
normative power and two types of convention.  
Subjects and Creators 
Some normative powers are powers you have to bind yourself. 
These are powers of voluntary commitment. An agreement (a contract, a 
promise, etc) is a type of voluntary commitment; so, too, is an 
undertaking. Now observe that some conventions bind any 
constitutional actor who occupies a certain role. These are role-
centred conventions. The convention that the monarch ought to grant 
assent to legislation is such a convention. The convention does not 
bind Queen Elizabeth II in particular; it binds anyone who 
occupies the role of monarch. Suppose that a constitutional actor 
makes an agreement. She has committed herself, but only herself. 
She has not bound future occupants of her constitutional role. 
Were her agreement a role-centred convention, it would bind 
future occupants of her role. Therefore, her agreement is not a 
role-centred convention. Generalizing, it is impossible for there to 
be a normative power the exercise of which (1) binds only 
yourself, and (2) creates a role-centred convention and thus binds 
anyone in a constitutional role.  
Some top-down sceptics appear to think that this argument, or 
one like it, shows that there is no such thing as a normative power 
to create a convention.34 They would be correct were powers of 
                                                 
34 Jaconelli n 7 above, 41: ‘Agreements … are regarded as morally (or legally, as 
the case may be) binding only on those who are parties to them. Yet the central 
idea behind constitutional conventions is the notion that they bind those who 
occupy for the time being the relevant offices of state, regardless of whether 
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voluntary commitment the only kind of normative power, and 
were role-centred conventions the only kind of convention. 
Neither of these things is true, though. Some normative powers 
are powers to bind, not yourself (or only yourself), but others. A 
normative power over others is authority.35 Further, some 
conventions bind, not constitutional actors qua actors, but 
governmental institutions. These are institution-centred conventions. 
The conventions that regulate the relationship between the House 
of Commons and the House of Lords are institution-centred 
conventions, for example, as are the conventions that regulate the 
police and the army.  
So we accept that a constitutional actor cannot commit only 
herself and thereby create a convention. That leaves open the 
possibility that a constitutional actor could exercise authority over 
others and thereby create a convention. It also leaves open the 
possibility that an institution could commit itself and thereby 
create a convention. We can now sharpen our question. Earlier we 
asked: are there normative powers to create conventions? But it is 
more perspicuous to ask: do any institutions have the power to 
bind themselves? And do any constitutional actors have the power 
to bind other constitutional actors? 
Power-Conferring Rules 
If an institution has the power to bind itself, or an actor has the 
power to bind others, then these powers must come from 
somewhere. It is clear where legal powers, like the power to 
contract, come from: they are conferred by legal rules. And it is 
clear where moral powers, like the power to promise, come from: 
moral rules. A power to create a convention does not come from 
law or morality. So where could it come from? Some top-down 
sceptics seem to assume there are no sources of normative powers 
other than law and morality.36 Were that correct, it would follow 
                                                                                                         
they have agreed to them or not.’ McHarg n 26 above, 860 makes a similar 
point.  
35 n 31 above, 101.  
36 Jaconelli n 7 above, 41 seems to assume that any agreement must be either 
morally or legally binding. McHarg at n 26 above, 860-861 appears to assume 
that, insofar as conventions are binding, they must be morally binding.   
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that there are no normative powers to create conventions. But this 
assumption overlooks an alternate source of normative powers – 
social rules, including conventions.  
Suppose that some group has a social rule of the form: ‘If A 
says “Everyone ought to B”, then everyone ought to B’. And 
suppose that the group accepts this rule because they want A to 
have a way to bind the group, and they expect she will not say 
‘Everyone ought to B’ unless she wants to bind them to B. Then A 
has authority over the group.37 If she exercises her authority, the 
result is a new rule, which says: ‘Everyone ought to B’. Similarly, 
the group might have a rule which says: ‘If anyone says “I 
undertake to B”, then that person ought to B’. So long as the other 
conditions of a normative power are met, this social rule gives the 
members of the group a power to bind themselves. Here, then, are 
two forms of power-conferring social rules.  
 There are lots of everyday examples of power-conferring social 
rules. An authority-conferring rule is obviously at the heart of 
‘Simple Simon Says’, a game that is constituted by social rules. A 
club or team might have a social rule that vests authority in the 
leader or captain to make decisions for the club or team as a whole 
(eg, when to practice, which formations to use). Or suppose that at 
the beginning of an academic conference panel the chair says that 
questions will be taken in threes and answered together. She has 
created a new rule for those attending the panel. She had the 
power to do so by virtue of a social rule amongst academic 
conference-goers, according to which the instructions of chairs as 
to questions ought to be followed.  
 Social rules could give governmental institutions the power to 
bind themselves, and certain constitutional actors the power to 
bind others. These social rules would be constitutional in 
character. Earlier we said that any social, non-legal rule of the 
constitution is a bottom-up convention. An alternate source of 
normative powers to create conventions has therefore been hiding 
in plain sight:  the normative powers to create top-down 
conventions could be conferred by bottom-up conventions. This is 
                                                 
37 Specifically, A has de facto authority. If there are in fact good reasons for A 
to have a way to bind others, then she has legitimate authority.  
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not merely a hypothetical possibility: there are in fact bottom-up, 
power-conferring conventions, as we shall now explain.  
The Ministerial Code Convention  
The Ministerial Code (as it is now called) began its life in 1945, 
when Clement Attlee brought together various directives about 
ministerial procedure in a single document.38 The Ministerial Code 
became a fixture of government: a new version was prepared after 
each general election, and circulated to ministers. Over time, the 
Code expanded and grew in importance. The current version sets 
out standards applicable to ministers on a wide range of matters 
including Parliament, appointments, departments, constituency 
interests, relations with the media, and the presentation of policy.39  
 The Ministerial Code used to be regarded as a set of mere 
guidelines, but it is now treated as a set of binding rules by 
ministers, their critics, and the public. Amy Baker, in her excellent 
history of the Code, Prime Ministers and the Rule Book, dates this 
development to the Code’s publication in 1992, when the Code 
began to be cited as an authoritative set of requirements, which 
ministers must comply with on pain of resignation.40 Baker writes: 
 
The publication of [the Ministerial Code] marks a watershed 
in the document’s history. Since its release, the media and 
members of Parliament have … used [the Ministerial Code] 
as a strict code of conduct by which to judge and regulate 
ministerial behaviour.41 
 
Baker concludes that the Code has become ‘a consolidated set of 
rules and principles governing the constitutional conduct of 
ministerial office’42.  
                                                 
38 A. Baker, Prime Ministers and the Rule Book (London: Politico’s Publishing, 
2000) ch 1.  
39 Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code (2015).  
40 A. Baker, Prime Ministers and the Rule Book (London: Politico’s Publishing, 
2000). 
41 ibid 104. 
42ibid.  
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 Two examples help to show the Code’s binding status. Shortly 
after the Code’s publication, the National Heritage Secretary, 
David Mellor, was accused of inappropriately accepting gifts from 
the daughter of a prominent member of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation. The shadow Heritage Minister at the time, Bryan 
Gould, pointed to the specific paragraph of the Ministerial Code to 
show that Mellor had breached the rules of his office. Lord Blake 
told The Times in an interview during the controversy: ‘If it 
becomes clear that David Mellor has breached [the Ministerial Code] 
he should resign and he should do so without delay’43. Even 
Mellor’s defenders framed their arguments with reference to the 
Code, implicitly accepting its determinative status. Eventually, 
Mellor did resign.44 To take a more recent example, in 2010, 
Baroness Warsi told the Prime Minister of allegations that 
arrangements for a visit she made to Pakistan had resulted in the 
appearance of a conflict of interest and thus a breach of the Code. 
The Prime Minister asked the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ 
Interests to investigate. Ultimately his report cleared Baroness 
Warsi of any serious breach of the Code.45 The point, for our 
purposes, is that compliance with the Code was not treated as 
optional; it was assumed to be mandatory.46 
The power to change the Ministerial Code lies with the Prime 
Minister. The Prime Minister can, and often does, unilaterally add 
to or subtract from the Code. ‘It is for the Prime Minister to 
determine the terms of the Code.’47 Moreover, while the Code 
                                                 
43 Lord Blake, ‘Tough Talk on Gift Guidelines; Diary’ The Times, 24 September 
1992, 12.  
44 For a more detailed overview of the Mellor affair, see Baker n 40 above, 73-
75. 
45 Correspondence between Sir Alex Allan and the Prime Minister, ‘Report on 
Investigation Under the Ministerial Code’ (27 June 2012) at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sir-alex-allan-s-report-on-
investigation-under-the-ministerial-code (last accessed 16 April 2018). See also:  
M. Everett and E. Faulkner, ‘The Ministerial Code and the Independent Adviser 
on Ministers’ Interests’ (House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, No 03750, 
12 January 2017) 21.  
46 N. Barber provides earlier examples along the same lines in ‘Laws and 
Conventions’ (2009) 125 LQR 295, 305.  
47 ‘Government Memorandum in Response to the Third Report from the Public 
Administration Select Committee (Session 2000-2001) on the Ministerial Code’ 
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includes some established practices, it is not primarily descriptive. 
There are frequent substantive changes, designed to shape practice 
rather than to merely reflect it. In 1995, for example, the Code was 
amended to include an obligation not to ‘knowingly mislead 
Parliament’48. In 2005, the Code was amended to state that 
ministers ‘must … comply with the Codes of Conduct for their 
respective Houses and any requirements’49 imposed by the 
Parliamentary Standards Authority. It used to be voluntary for a 
minister to seek advice from the Advisory Committee on Business 
Appointments Rules about taking up outside appointment on 
leaving office50. A 2007 amendment made it obligatory.51 
Now let us put the pieces together, in two stages. We said 
earlier that there is a bottom-up convention that As ought to B if 
(1) As B often enough, and (2) enough constitutional actors accept 
that As ought to B. We know that ministers consistently do as the 
Code says, and that ministers (and others) accept they ought to do 
as the Code says. That alone shows there is a bottom-up 
convention that ministers ought to do as the Code says. We are 
not alone in this conclusion. There is a ‘new convention’, Nick 
Barber says, which imposes ‘a duty on Ministers to follow the rules 
set out in the Code’52. We shall call this the Ministerial Code 
Convention.  
Now for the second stage: given that the Code can be changed 
by the Prime Minister, the Ministerial Code Convention requires 
compliance with the Prime Minister’s rules, when they take the 
form of amendments to the Code. The Ministerial Code 
Convention therefore confers authority on the Prime Minister 
over ministers. The Prime Minister exercises this authority by 
adding to the Code. It follows, with one qualification, that the 
rules the Prime Minister adds to the Code are top-down 
conventions. The qualification is that not all of the rules in the 
                                                                                                         
(UK Parliament, 11 December 2001) at <https://goo.gl/P19xMa> (last 
accessed 3 January 2017).  
48 Everett and Faulkner n 45 above, 19. 
49 Currently para. 1.6 in the Ministerial Code 2015: n 39 above. The history of the 
amendment is described by Everett and Faulkner n 45 above, 20.    
50 Governance of Britain n 22 above, at [121].  
51 Everett and Faulkner n 45 above, 21.  
52 Barber n 46 above, 305. 
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Code have a constitutional character. The Code’s rule against using 
official social media accounts for party political reasons is not part 
of the constitution, for example. The Code’s rules as to ministerial 
conduct and private interests, by contrast, clearly do have a 
constitutional character, and are therefore top-down conventions. 
Indeed, there is reason to think that the Ministerial Code ‘may now 
be taken as the defining constitutional document on [the] Prime 
Minister and Cabinet’53.  
 There are many codes of conduct, and we do not claim that 
they all involve convention-based authority relationships. What 
matters is whether there is a bottom-up convention that requires 
compliance with a code, and how that code can be changed. It 
seems clear to us that there is no convention that requires 
compliance with the Guide to Judicial Conduct54, for example. On 
the other hand, there may be a stronger case for a convention that 
requires compliance with the parliamentary codes of conduct. 
What we have sought to show is that some conventions confer 
authority on constitutional actors to make rules for other 
constitutional actors. Now let us show that top-down conventions 
can also be found outside the Ministerial Code.  
The Institutional Agreement Convention  
In 2013 the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice established 
a concordat. The concordat sets out the division of responsibilities 
among the Lord Chancellor, President of the Court, and Chief 
Executive of the Court. It makes provision for consultation and 
exchange of information on appointments and remuneration, 
among other matters. It creates a method for resolving disputes, 
and a process for review and amendment. The parties declare that 
they ‘agree to abide by the provisions and obligations’55 in the 
concordat wherever possible.  
                                                 
53 P. Madgwick and D. Woodhouse, The Law and Politics of the Constitution of the 
United Kingdom (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995) 120. 
54 Judges’ Council, Guide to Judicial Conduct (2018). 
55 ‘Concordat Between: The Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom’ (The Supreme Court, 30 October 2013) at 
<https://goo.gl/dSrPvR> (last accessed 4 January 2017).   
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 By establishing their concordat, the Supreme Court and the 
Ministry of Justice purported to create an agreement, and so to 
bind themselves. They purported to exercise a normative power. 
Where would they have acquired this power? Our answer should 
come as no surprise: from a bottom-up power-conferring 
convention. This bottom-up convention required the Supreme 
Court and the Ministry of Justice to do as they represented they 
would, and the two institutions triggered the convention with their 
concordat. The result was an agreement.  
Top-down sceptics will spot an immediate problem with this 
answer. Any bottom-up convention has to be grounded in a 
practice. In 2013 there was no history of the Ministry of Justice or 
(especially) the Supreme Court doing as it represented it would. 
There was no history of acceptance that these institutions ought to 
live up to their representations to each other. If there is no history, 
there is no practice; and if there is no practice, how could there be 
a bottom-up convention? 
 The solution is to see the Supreme Court-Ministry of Justice 
concordat in context, as part of a series of agreements between 
institutions. There are rules that apply to a specific person because 
they apply to a class of person to which she belongs (eg, the rules 
of the road, the rules of etiquette). In the same way, there is a 
convention that requires the specific institutions that are the 
Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice to keep their agreement 
because there is a convention that requires governmental 
institutions generally to live up to their representations. This 
convention is grounded in the long practice of institutions doing as 
they represent they will do, on the one hand, and of the acceptance 
that they ought to do so, on the other.  
As evidence of this practice, consider: 
 
1. Conference agreements. There was a series of Colonial and Imperial 
Conferences between 1887 and 1937. At these conferences, 
representatives of various governments purported to reach non-
legal agreements on aspects of Commonwealth relations. For 
example, even after the Statute of Westminster 1931, ‘[t]he 
position of the Governor-General … [was] determined by 
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agreements at the Conferences of 1926 and 1930’56. Likewise, ‘[t]he 
system of communication and consultation between the 
Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations was 
agreed upon’57 at the same conferences. According to R.T.E. 
Latham, the ‘conventions of co-operation’ between 
Commonwealth states were ‘for the most part planned’58. He 
writes that ‘[r]eports of imperial conferences repeatedly enunciate 
comprehensive rules for the conduct of treaty negotiations and 
other matters of foreign policy’59. These agreements were generally 
upheld, with occasional lapses. 
 
2. Devolution agreements. Following devolution, in 1999, the UK 
government and the devolved governments of Northern Ireland, 
Scotland, and Wales issued a Memorandum of Understanding 
along with various supplementary agreements. The Memorandum 
characterizes itself as a statement of ‘political intent’. The 
agreements in it are described as ‘binding in honour’. Like the 
conference agreements, the devolution agreements are about inter-
governmental communication, consultation, and co-operation. The 
best-known devolution agreement is the ‘Sewel Convention’, 
which requires the Westminster Parliament to obtain the consent 
of the Scottish Parliament before legislating on matters devolved 
to Scotland. (There are equivalent consent requirements with 
respect to Northern Ireland and Wales.) Other devolution 
agreements also have a constitutional character – the agreement to 
create the Joint Ministerial Committee, for example, or the 
agreement to co-operate on foreign and international affairs. The 
devolution agreements are generally abided by, again with 
occasional departures.  
 
3. Other concordats. The concordat between the Supreme Court and 
the Ministry of Justice is one of many concordats involving 
departments or committees. For example, in 1932 the Treasury 
and the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee agreed 
                                                 
56 Jennings n 8 above, 98-99. 
57 ibid 99. 
58 R.T.E. Latham, The Law and the Commonwealth (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1949) 158. 
59 ibid. 
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that, in general, authority for expenditures ought to flow from a 
specific statute, rather than from an Appropriations Act. In the 
words of the Constitution Committee, the ‘1932 concordat 
amounts to a self-denying ordinance by the Treasury’60, which 
would be respected ‘in the interests of constitutional propriety’61. 
Or, to take a more recent example, prior to the enactment of the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, there was a concordat between 
the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor concerning the 
latter’s judiciary-related functions. This concordat remains ‘of great 
constitutional importance’62, despite being partially superseded by 
the 2005 Act. Lord Phillips said ‘[i]t has … been treated as if it 
were a constitutional document laying down the division of 
functions’.63  
 
None of these examples could ground a bottom-up convention on 
their own. Together, though, they amount to a practice that 
stretches back almost 150 years. This practice consists of 
governmental institutions making formal representations to each 
other; of these institutions living up to their representations; and 
of the acceptance they they ought to do so. That is enough to 
conclude that there is a bottom-up convention that institutions 
ought to fulfil their representations to each other. By making 
representations to each other, institutions trigger this convention, 
creating new norms, and thus new top-down conventions. These 
self-imposed top-down conventions are agreements. We will call 
the bottom-up convention that makes them possible the 
Institutional Agreement Convention. To return to our original example, 
the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice made a 
constitutional agreement by triggering the Institutional Agreement 
Convention.  
Convention Structures 
                                                 
60 Select Committee on the Constitution, The Pre-emption of Parliament HL 165 
(2012-2013) at [13].  
61 ibid. 
62 Select Committee on the Constitution, Relations Between the Executive, the 
Judiciary, and Parliament HL 151 (2006-2007) at [13]. 
63 ibid at [14].  
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At this point we have shown that there are top-down conventions 
which issue from bottom-up conventions.64 Let us say that a 
bottom-up convention and the top-down conventions that issue 
from it form an interlocking convention structure, or convention structure 
for short65. The conventions that make up the structure are its 
elements. As well as being the home of top-down conventions, 
convention structures have other interesting features, of which we 
shall mention two.  
 First, the elements in convention structures are mutually 
reinforcing. The bottom-up element in a convention structure 
requires compliance with the top-down elements. It supports, or 
backs, the top-down elements in the same structure. To comply 
with a top-down convention is not only to comply with that 
convention; it is also to comply with the bottom-up convention 
that is part of the same structure. At the same time, a bottom-up 
convention depends on a practice. That practice is partly 
constituted by compliance with the bottom-up convention, and 
hence by compliance with the top-down elements of the same 
structure. When those top-down elements are complied with, the 
bottom-up element is strengthened. Conversely, violations of top-
down conventions weaken the bottom-up elements of the same 
structure. So, the top-down elements in a convention structure are 
backed by the bottom-up element, while compliance with the top-
down elements sustains the bottom-up element.  
 Second, convention structures are resilient, in that they can 
withstand localized or concentrated non-compliance. A bottom-up 
                                                 
64 A clarification: Rules are norms, as are orders. Rules regulate general acts; 
orders regulate specific acts. Because conventions are rules, and our interest is 
conventions, we have focused on powers to make rules of a constitutional 
character. But there are also powers to make orders of a constitutional character. 
The Cardinal Convention is one example. The ministers’ directives are binding 
on the monarch. One reason we regard the ministers’ directives as binding on 
the monarch is that we want them to have a way to bind the monarch. So the 
Cardinal Convention confers authority on ministers over the monarch. The 
ministers’ directives are not conventions (because they are not rules), but they 
are still binding norms, made possible by the bottom-up convention that is the 
Cardinal Convention.  
65 T. Honoré uses the term ‘interlocking structure’ to describe the relationship 
between social norms and the norms created under them in Making Law Bind: 
Essays Legal and Philosophical (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 83.  
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convention is a social rule, so it exists only as long as it is generally 
complied with. Top-down conventions are not social rules, and 
they exist only as long as the bottom-up convention in the same 
structure continues to exist. In the convention structures we have 
described, there is a bottom-up convention and multiple top-down 
conventions. Imagine one top-down convention in such a 
structure is generally broken. If there is general compliance with 
enough other top-down conventions in that structure, then there is 
general compliance with the bottom-up convention in that 
structure. The structure as a whole is maintained, and all the 
conventions in it survive – including the top-down convention 
that is generally broken. Thus, the Sewel Convention would be 
binding even if it were generally broken, as long as agreements 
between institutions were generally kept, and it was generally 
accepted that they ought to be kept.66  
 We have so far shown that top-down conventions are a reality, 
contrary to what is often claimed. Now, we turn to the legitimacy 
of top-down conventions and of conventional regulation generally.   
LEGITIMACY AND CONVENTIONAL REGULATION 
How desirable is it that the British constitution relies so heavily on 
non-legal regulation of the various kinds we have just discussed? 
This question has received, as McHarg observes, ‘curiously little 
attention from constitutional lawyers’.67 It is neglected in favour of 
other (important) questions: about the nature, bindingness, and 
existence of conventions, detailed examination of the content and 
development of particular conventions, or the contrast between 
conventions and law. Barber suggests that the latter is of  ‘especial’ 
importance in the United Kingdom due to ‘the unusual 
significance and quantity of conventions in the United Kingdom's 
                                                 
66 Partly for this reason, convention structures are susceptible to manipulation. 
Suppose the Prime Minister wishes to bolster his power to create binding rules 
for ministers. It will be in the Prime Minister’s interests to add some rules to the 
Ministerial Code that require acts that Ministers would have performed anyway. 
Why? Because the Prime Minister’s power to create binding rules for ministers 
depends on general compliance with the rules he makes. He can increase the 
rate of compliance by requiring some ‘popular’ acts. 
67 n 26 above, 856. 
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constitution’68. But for that same reason, the legitimacy question is 
also especially important; the legitimacy of a core method of 
regulating the power of the state should be at the centre of 
constitutional analysis. Moreover (and this is the reason McHarg 
considers the neglect to be ‘curious’) conventions raise particularly 
pressing legitimacy questions. That is because conventions are a 
form of self-regulation in a field where that might seem wholly and 
obviously inappropriate. Constitutionalism essentially requires the 
regulation of constitutional actors whereas self-regulation raises 
the spectre of self-interested partisanship. As Peter Cane once said, 
‘those actively engaged in an activity might be inclined to run it in 
a way which suits them’ as it ‘is clearly an advantage to the 
regulated to be able to decide the rules of the game. The obvious 
disadvantage of this is that the rules made may not properly 
protect the public interest’.69 This concern strikes us as particularly 
pressing in the constitutional context; whilst self-regulation is 
desirable in many contexts it is, on the face of it, the antithesis of 
constitutionalism, and the legitimacy of constitutional conventions 
ought to have attracted more sustained attention.70 
 One consequence of our argument so far is that there is not 
one neglected legitimacy question but two. Instead of asking ‘is 
conventional regulation legitimate?’, we should ask whether 
bottom-up conventional regulation is legitimate and whether top-
down conventional regulation is legitimate. We take up both of 
these questions below. Our aim is not to develop a full blooded 
account of the legitimacy of either species of convention. Instead 
we aim to identify normatively salient features of bottom-up and 
top-down conventions to encourage reflection and further 
conversation on the legitimacy of conventional regulation. We 
suggest that neglect of the legitimacy question is understandable 
with respect to bottom-up conventions, but that there are good 
reasons to be cautious (suspicious, even) with respect to top-down 
conventions.  
                                                 
68 n 46 above, 294. 
69 P. Cane, ‘Self Regulation and Judicial Review’ [1987] Civil Justice Quarterly 324, 
325, 329 
70 And, as McHarg notes, ‘constitutional lawyers … have tended to be 
suspicious of the legitimacy of self-regulatory practices in other contexts’: n 26 
above, 856. 
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Legitimacy and Bottom-Up Conventions 
Two facts about bottom-up conventions make inattention to their 
legitimacy less surprising. First, they fill a regulatory vacuum which 
would otherwise be embarrassing. Grateful that the vacuum has 
been filled, we tend not to ask about the desirability of it being 
filled in this way. Instead, we focus on other questions. For 
example, both Jennings and Jaconelli are interested in the 
conditions under which a convention exists.71 Barber, meanwhile, 
is concerned with the differences between conventions and the 
form of regulation we might have expected to be using, namely, 
laws.72 There is interest in establishing that a vacuum has been 
filled, and in how it has been filled. But interest in those questions 
stops short of engagement with the desirability of filling a vacuum 
in a particular, self-regulatory way.  
Second, the subject matter and effect of the most prominent 
cluster of constitutional conventions is overwhelmingly positive. 
For example, the Cardinal Convention is part of a prominent 
cluster of conventions which secure the (de facto) transfer of 
much prerogative power from the monarch to ministers and which 
curtail any discretion in her exercise of her remaining personal 
prerogative power (like the Royal Assent and appointment of 
ministers). This development of ‘constitutional rules that limit the 
powers of the monarch such that we live in a democracy rather 
than a dictatorship’73 is self-evidently desirable. Conventions might 
be an idiosyncratic method of securing that particular 
development, but the development itself obviously stands in no 
real need of defence. These are key examples of conventions, and 
the need for evaluation of conventional regulation as a technique is 
obscured.  
So much, so obvious. But bottom-up conventions also have 
other important features which help shield them from criticism. 
What follows should not be understood as a list of necessary 
characteristics of bottom up conventions. Rather it is a list of 
characteristics which bottom up conventions typically have. A 
                                                 
71 Jennings n 8 above; Jaconelli n 7 above.  
72 n 46 above.  
73 A. Tucker, ‘Constitutional Writing and Constitutional Rights’ [2013] PL 345, 
351. 
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paradigmatic or central case of a bottom-up convention might well 
have them all (in fact, we think such central cases exist, for 
example, the convention requiring the Queen to grant Royal 
Assent to duly passed legislation). But other, less typical, bottom-
up conventions with fewer of these characteristics exist as well. 
With those caveats in place, five characteristics are worth dwelling 
on.  
 
1. Bottom-up conventions are not made intentionally. Bottom-up 
conventions typically arise from people’s behaviour. However, 
whilst that behaviour is (we would expect) itself intentional, it is 
not behaviour which is engaged in with the intention of creating or 
changing rules. For example, in systematically giving Royal Assent 
to legislation passed by the Houses of Parliament, monarchs were 
of course intentionally and deliberating attempting to assent to 
legislation. But none of these successive assents were intended to 
create a rule. Similarly, the repeated appointments as Prime 
Minister of the person most able to command a majority in the 
House of Commons were intended (merely) as appointments, 
rather than attempts to create or change a rule about who ought to 
be appointed.  In time, of course, such intentions can become rule-
oriented, as actors orient their behaviour to the rule. But then the 
intention is essentially an intention to conform to the rule, rather 
than to make or change it. In this way, ministers who have 
resigned in consequence of a breach of the convention of 
ministerial responsibility do have an intention about a rule. They 
may even be conscious that their behaviour reinforces the rule. But 
the relevant intention is that of conforming to, not making or re-
making the rule itself. So bottom-up conventions emerge, 
unintentionally and hence accidentally, from the underlying 
behaviour. They are not intentionally created. And so the risk that 
they will be used to create damaging, self-interested rules is 
attenuated. 
 
2. Bottom-up conventions are not made expressly. Bottom-up conventions 
typically emerge from and exist in people’s behaviour, rather than 
in and from their words. One consequence of this is that they have 
no canonical formulation. This means that understanding 
(interpreting) the rule is not tied to particular words. Flexibility is 
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not necessarily a virtue, but the kind of flexibility introduced by 
this feature of conventions is important because it is much harder 
to bind your successors to an undesirable, self-interested rule if 
you cannot fix the rule in a canonical formulation.  
 
These first two characteristics together have an important 
consequence, which it is worth pausing to highlight.  They are the 
main source of the (famous) characteristic vagueness of 
conventions, which is hence like the vagueness of social rules.74  As 
they develop, rules which are made neither intentionally nor 
expressly are untethered from their creators (for there is neither 
intention nor formulation to tether them to), and their 
development depends on the behaviour of the current generation 
of rule-users.  And that behaviour is driven by those rule-users’ 
understanding of the contemporary rationale of the rule.75  
Consider, for example, the indeterminacy in the constitutional 
convention governing Royal Assent. There is even today some 
uncertainty whether this convention eliminates entirely the 
monarch’s veto over legislation or whether some discretion 
subsists so the veto could still be exercised in exceptional 
circumstances. Brazier, for example, has speculated that there are 
some scenarios in which the exercise of the royal veto may still be 
constitutionally proper, not just on ministerial advice (after a 
change of government, ministerial opposition to a private 
member’s bill) but even against ministerial advice (serious 
legislative impropriety, legislation prolonging Parliament’s life and 
legislation permanently subverting the democratic basis of the 
constitution).76  So there is indeterminacy in the rule, and the 
outcome in scenarios where it matters would depend neither on 
any previous monarch’s intention about such situations, nor on a 
previous monarch’s formulation of a rule covering such situations.  
It would depend on the present monarch’s own understanding of 
the nature of her obligation.  This type of vagueness detaches the 
                                                 
74 Governance of Britain n 22 above, ch 7. 
75 A. Tucker, ‘Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition and in the Doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2011) 31 OJLS 61. 
76 R. Brazier, ‘Royal Assent to Legislation’ (2013) 129 LQR 184, 201–202. 
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requirements of the rule from its creation and redirects the focus 
of controversy to contemporary concerns. 
 
3. Bottom-up conventions have diffuse authorship. Bottom-up conventions 
are typically role-centred conventions. They arise out of the 
behaviour of multiple people, each occupying the same or similar 
roles, but at different times, with different partisan and personal 
interests, and in shifting political circumstances. So whilst the 
creation of the rule is a collective enterprise, the creative behaviour 
is not coordinated or part of any kind of joint project. It consists 
of actions which are distinct from each other, rather than part of a 
long, communal rule-making enterprise. There is no common 
project. As John Gardner says (of customary law, but the point is 
true here too): conventions are ‘not the work of many working as 
one … [they are] … the work of many acting as many.’77 .  
 
4. Bottom-up conventions are asystematic. Barber, following Colin 
Munro, emphasises that conventions typically have a kind of 
informality.78 By informality, Barber and Munro mean that 
constitutional conventions form a ‘discrete unconnected set’79 in 
the sense that they are not embedded in a wider system of rules. 
There is ‘no authoritative mark of their existence, no rules which 
determine whether or not political actors ought to regard them as 
binding … no rules which regulate their production, no 
institutions to adjudicate upon their breach.’80 Barber concedes 
that ‘it would obviously be going too far to claim that conventions 
are completely non-systematic’ on the grounds that ‘it is actually 
quite hard to conceive of a social rule which does not, in some 
way, rely on or interact with other rules’81. But mere interaction or 
haphazard inter-reliance is a particularly weak form of 
                                                 
77 J. Gardner, ‘Some Types of Law’ in D. Edlin (ed), Common Law Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 23. 
78 n 46 above, 302, citing C. Munro, ‘Laws and Conventions Distinguished’ 
(1975) 91 LQR 218, 233.   
79 Munro n 78 above, 233.  
80 Barber n 46 above, 302. 
81 ibid. 
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systematicity.82 It has nothing to do with the nature of bottom-up 
conventions as a form of regulation. We can see this through 
Jennings’ Test, which is (rightly) blind to the systematicity of the 
rules whose existence it seeks to capture. Conventions of the same 
constitution inevitably interact with each other, yet they exist and 
are constituted independently of each other.  
 
5. Bottom-up conventions are self-regarding. Finally, bottom-up 
conventions do not impose obligations on people other than those 
whose behaviour creates them. More precisely, they tend to be 
(what we called above) role-centred, regulating only people occupying 
the same role as made them and regulating them only insofar as 
their actions are performed in that role. Conventions which 
emerge from Prime Ministerial behaviour regulate only Prime 
Ministers, and conventions which emerge from the behaviour of 
monarchs regulate only monarchs. The actors involved only 
acquire the power to regulate their own (and their successors’) 
behaviour rather than extend their regulatory influence to other 
actors in the constitutional system. For example, the existence of a 
convention on Royal Assent – created by and applicable to 
monarchs – might superficially give reason to worry about the 
consequences of giving the monarch a power to regulate the 
outcome of the legislative process. But, more precisely, the 
monarch only acquires through this convention a (more 
circumscribed, narrowly focussed) power to regulate the 
monarch’s involvement in the outcome of the legislative process.  
 
Individually, each of these five features helps to counter the 
objection from self-regulation. Together, though, these features are 
significant enough to explain (and maybe even to justify) 
constitutional lawyers’ relative inattention to the question of the 
legitimacy of bottom-up conventions, despite them being an 
otherwise surprisingly important instance of self-regulation at the 
heart of the constitution.  
Legitimacy and Top-Down Conventions 
                                                 
82 Indeed, as we have just seen, Barber’s own account of systematicity (quoted 
ibid) is substantially richer than that.  
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As may have already become clear, this cluster of redeeming 
characteristics is not shared by top-down conventions, which thus 
cannot claim even the modest virtue of bottom-up conventions. In 
fact, quite the opposite. Again, we do not intend this section as a 
list of necessary characteristics of top-down conventions. Rather it 
is a group of characteristics which top-down conventions typically 
have. A paradigmatic or central case of a top-down convention 
might well have them all but other, less typical, top-down 
conventions with fewer of these characteristics exist as well, 
without forfeiting their basic status as top-down conventions. With 
those caveats once more in place, these characteristics are worth 
dwelling on at length.  
 
1. Top-down conventions are intentionally made. Top-down conventions 
do not emerge accidentally or unintentionally from behaviour. 
Instead, they are typically the product of an intentional attempt to 
make a rule. For example, the actors who collectively generated the 
Sewel Convention could not be said to have been participating in 
the practice of securing the consent of the Scottish Parliament 
before legislating on reserved matters. Their actions were about 
rather than a part of that activity – directed, and intentionally so, 
towards the articulation and institutionalisation of a rule binding 
those who do participate in the legislative process. Similarly, when 
the Prime Minister publishes a new version of the Ministerial 
Code, he is obviously not simply participating in the practices 
which it describes. Rather, her intention is to attach binding force 
to the rules it contains.   
 
2. Top-down conventions are expressly made. Unlike bottom-up 
conventions, top-down conventions do not emerge; rather they are 
made. More precisely, they are created in words, in a text. This 
means that they have a canonical formulation and their meaning is 
tied to those words. For example, the Sewel Convention originates 
in (the text of) Lord Sewel’s speech in the House of Lords; it is 
further specified in (the text of) the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the UK and Scottish Governments and its requirements 
are more concretely articulated in (the text of) Devolution Guidance 
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Note 10 (DG10).83 Controversy about the scope of the Sewel 
convention thus takes place primarily in the light of the 
requirements of those texts. It would, therefore, be essentially 
implausible to argue that something which these texts requires was 
not, after all, required by the Convention.  
Consider, for example, the important contemporary 
controversy about the scope of the Sewel Convention. Lord Sewel 
initially promised a convention which would apply whenever 
Westminster legislates ‘with regard to devolved matters’84. But note 
that this promise, and the notion of ‘legislating with regard to’ is 
ambiguous about whether the Convention’s demands extend only 
to legislation which regulates matters which are currently devolved, 
or whether it also extends to legislation changing what counts as a 
devolved matter – that is, there is an ambiguity about whether the 
Sewel convention is restricted to legislation which (‘merely’) 
trespasses upon the devolution settlements as they stand or 
whether it also extends to legislation amending the devolution 
settlements themselves. DG10 explicitly takes sides in this 
controversy by characterising the Convention as applicable to 
legislation altering the competences of the Scottish Parliament or 
of the Scottish Ministers. And debate about the convention is 
constrained by this textual foundation. Consider, for example, the 
parliamentary debate on (what is now) section 2 of the Scotland 
Act 2016, which aims to put the Sewel Convention on a statutory 
footing and whose text reflects the briefer, ambiguous version of 
the convention. During its passage through Parliament, the 
Government (successfully) resisted amendments which sought to 
expand this provision into articulating the more explicitly broad 
understanding of the convention found in DG10. But, importantly, 
this resistance was not on the grounds that this would not 
faithfully capture the requirements of the convention.85 The textual 
                                                 
83 UK Cabinet Office, Devolution Guidance Note 10: Post-devolution primary 
legislation affecting Scotland; Memorandum of Understanding and 
Supplementary Agreements between the United Kingdom Government, the 
Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive 
Committee (October 2013) 
84 HL Deb vol 592 col 791 21 July 1998.  
85 Proposed amendments to this effect were resisted on the grounds that “the 
bill adopt[ed] the language that formed the basis of the Sewel Convention” 
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nature of the convention, and the way it is articulated in DG10 
would have made such an argument implausible.  Conversely, it is 
extremely difficult to argue that something which the texts do not 
require is part of the Convention.   
 
Again, one upshot of these two features of top-down conventions 
is best appreciated by considering them together. Top-down 
conventions are vague, but they are vague in a different way to 
bottom-up conventions.  Their meaning is tethered to the 
intentions of their creators, and the language which those creators 
use to express the rule. In other words, theirs is the vagueness of 
written rules rather than of social rules.  
For example, consider the Salisbury-Addison convention.  In a 
speech in the House of Commons in 2006, Chris Bryant MP 
conceived of this rule as intentionally created and written, and 
characterised the controversy about its content as a choice 
between two conceptions of the rule – one 120 years old, and the 
other formulated in 1947.  His argument was about where the 
convention is tethered, but takes for granted that it must be 
tethered somewhere, in a way that determines its contemporary 
meaning.86   This empowers the actors responsible for that 
formulation as who thereby have an enhanced role in fixing the 
meaning of the rule.   
Or, consider again the ambiguity about the scope of the Sewel 
convention.  In R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union, the Supreme Court declined not just to enforce the Sewel 
Convention, but also to interpret it or rule on its scope. 87  But the 
court did describe evidence for the broader of the two rival 
understandings of the convention – that is, a pattern of legislative 
                                                                                                         
which had been “consistently adhered to by successive UK governments”. See 
in the speech(es) of D. Mundell MP at HC Deb vol 597 col 105 15 June 2015. 
86 HC Deb, 20 June 2006, c366.  Note that we conceive of this particular 
convention differently, above, as a bottom-up convention which arose over time 
under the influence of Lord Salisbury and Lord Addison’s original accord.  If we 
are correct, then Bryant was mistaken to use the rule in this way; but our 
example here turns on the way he engaged with the rule, and not whether he 
was ultimately correct to approach it that way. 
87 R (Miller and others) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU 2017 UKSC 5, 2017 2 
WLR 583. at [136]-[151] (DC). 
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consent motions for statutes amending the devolution 
settlements.88  Alison Young has described this intervention into 
the controversy in the following terms: 
 
the court is observing the broader application of the Sewel 
Convention. The court is not creating this broader 
interpretation, it being instead created by the behaviour of 
the UK Parliament and the devolved legislatures.89 
 
But we think this mischaracterises the nature of the convention, 
and also the way in which the controversy stands to be settled.  
The behaviour the court described – a pattern of legislative 
consent motions for statutes amending the devolution settlements 
– did not create the rule. In fact, that behaviour can only properly 
be understood by taking into account the fact that each of the 
examples referred to by the court was not simply freestanding 
behaviour of the UK Parliament and the devolved legislatures, but 
rather behaviour shaped and constrained by the demands of a 
written rule intended to bind them to behave in that way.   
 
3. Top-down conventions are the product of coordination. Gardner says this 
about the way teamwork emerges in orchestras and legislatures, 
and how that unites their participants in a single agent: 
 
In teamwork, each team-member adapts her intentions to 
the actions and intentions of the others so as to avoid 
frustrating each other’s intentions. But that is not all. Each 
team member also adds an extra intention, that of 
contributing to the work of the team as a whole. She intends 
not only that she (and each of the others) should make their 
complementary efforts, but that this should also be part of a 
team effort. So her own intention makes an essential 
reference to the intention of the team. When it does so, it 
also helps to constitute the intention of the team.90  
                                                 
88 ibid at [140]. 
89 A. Young, ‘R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: 
thriller or vanilla?’ (2017) 42 European Law Review 280, 287. 
90 n 77 above, 58. 
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It would be going too far to describe the creators of top-down 
conventions as a single unified agent. Still, the degree to which the 
authorship of top-down conventions approaches this model is 
striking. They are the product of a kind of joint agency, whose 
members are responsive to each others’ intentions (intentions, 
recall, about the creation of a rule). The creation and development 
of these norms has a dimension of commonality and coherence. 
Recall the complex authorship of the Sewel Convention: its 
creators were clearly acting in concert in the enterprise of rule-
making. 
  
4. Top-down conventions are systematic. Barber recognises that top-
down conventions are a sign of growing formalisation. Indeed this 
is central to his argument that there is a scale of formality 
stretching from conventions to law and that the move to top-
down conventions is a move to a more formal (and hence more 
law-like) type of regulation.  As we explained above, systematicity 
is inherent to the nature of top-down conventions as they exist in 
interlocking convention structures (which are themselves a simple 
system) which reinforce each other, leading to reciprocal (and 
hence systematic) resilience. Furthermore, individual top-down 
conventions are prone to their own, individualised, formality. We 
see this clearly in the example of Baroness Warsi’s visit to Pakistan, 
which the Prime Minister referred to the Independent Adviser on 
Ministers’ Interests. The rule against conflicts of ministerial 
interests, is not simply captured in the text of the Ministerial Code. 
It is now accompanied by an institution competent to adjudicate 
(albeit in this instance non-authoritatively) on its breach.  
 
5. Top-down conventions are other-regarding. Finally, note that the 
obligations which are created by top-down conventions are 
typically imposed on actors other than the actors who create them. 
They involve Prime Ministers regulating (in the Ministerial Code) 
ministers or ministers and civil servants regulating (in the Sewel 
Convention) the legislature.  Thus, top-down conventions are the 
product of certain constitutional actors imposing binding 
obligations on others, without regard for role, hierarchy or 
legitimacy. Again, the Sewel Convention is particularly striking: it 
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was developed by the executive yet binds the democratic 
legislature.  
Cause for Concern 
We started by noting an objection to conventional regulation: as a 
form of self-regulation, conventional regulation seems to be prima 
facie illegitimate. Bottom-up conventions have a number of 
features which help address the objection from self-regulation. But 
top-down conventions are different. Top-down conventions are 
made deliberately, expressly, and by a single actor or group of 
actors working in concert. They are formal, hierarchical, and 
systematised. They are a way of exercising authority and extending 
power. If anything, top-down conventions seem to exacerbate our 
concerns about conventional regulation. It is perhaps 
understandable that bottom-up conventions have tended to avoid 
serious normative scrutiny, but top-down conventions warrant 
closer examination than they have received so far.  
 This dichotomy – bottom-up conventions as innocuous or 
welcome, top-down conventions as essentially suspect – is too neat 
however. It needs complicating in one important respect. Top-
down conventions are grounded in the use of a normative power, 
and such powers are conferred by bottom-up conventions. Thus, 
while most bottom-up conventions are innocuous or welcome, a 
few bottom-up conventions lay the groundwork for deliberate, 
concentrated, systematic regulation, and help to consolidate power 
in the hands of a relatively small number of constitutional actors 
(eg, the Prime Minister). For all the reasons we should be wary of 
top-down conventions, we should be wary of the bottom-up 
conventions which confer the powers to create them.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
No-one doubts the existence of bottom-up conventions, but many 
scholars doubt the existence of top-down conventions. Here we 
have offered a novel argument for the reality of top-down 
conventions. Top-down conventions are the exercise of normative 
powers conferred by social rules of the constitution, ie, bottom-up 
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conventions. There are at least two such bottom-up conventions, 
which have so far gone unnoticed. The Institutional Agreement 
Convention empowers government institutions to make binding 
commitments to each other. The Ministerial Code Convention 
empowers the Prime Minister to create rules for ministers by 
amending the Code. The powers conferred by these bottom-up 
conventions have been used to create many top-down 
conventions.  
 Given the centrality of conventions in the British constitution, 
surprisingly little attention is paid to the legitimacy of regulation by 
convention. We put forward the beginning of an explanation, by 
identifying five central features of bottom-up conventions. These 
features serve as a normative safety net, excusing and possibly 
even justifying reliance on bottom-up conventions. But top-down 
conventions do not share these features. Top-down conventions 
are the formal, systematic, intentional products of concentrated 
power and authority. There is no reason to be sanguine about top-
down conventions as a form of constitutional regulation; indeed, 
there is reason for concern.  
 Let us end on a positive, forward-looking note. To the extent 
that there is a problem with top-down conventions, the source of 
that problem is the bottom-up conventions which confer the 
powers to create them. As we said, bottom-up conventions depend 
on acceptance by constitutional actors. Acceptance is an attitude 
which is responsive to practical reasons, and which is under one’s 
voluntary control. What this means is that top-down conventions 
are not something we are stuck with. If constitutional actors decide 
that top-down conventions have had negative consequences, they 
can do away with the bottom-up conventions which make them 
possible. All they need to do is decide not to accept that certain 
constitutional actors have the power to deliberately bind 
themselves or others. We do not mean to diminish the difficulty of 
changing our mode of constitutional regulation. The point 
remains: constitutional actors created the powers under which top-
down conventions are created – and constitutional actors can 
dispense with those powers, if they will it.    
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